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1 Overview and detailed aspects
Can Eastern European economies develop strong family business sectors? In
some countries there is an embedded desire to pass the business on down the
generations, while there are countries such as Russia where successful entrepre-
neurs do not tend to have dynastic intentions. Ionov (2014) identies di¤erent
reasons why this happens. According to the author, corruption, real and per-
ceived, represents a deterrent to the development of family businesses. This
seems to be in collusion with previous results. As stated by Bertrand & Schoar
(2006:92): some papers such as Burkart, Panunzi & Shleifer (2003) and Caselli
& Gennaioli (2003) begin with an argument that if formal institutions regard-
ing investor protection, contract enforcement or property rights protection are
weak or nonexistent, strong family ties may provide a second-best solution for
the development of economic activity.
This paper investigates whether family rms operating in Eastern European
countries are a¤ected by corruption and also the existing link between the export
share of family rms and informal payments. We focus on the level of export,
since we consider it as an important, as well an invaluable, method to support
and enhance rmsgrowth.
The persisting nancial di¢ culties of the Euro area, the weak recovery in
several other advanced economies (e.g. United States), the expected slowdown
in economic growth in China and India as a result of a continuous increasing
in the volatility of nancial markets, leads institutions to ask which regions can
drive growth and employment creation in the short to medium term (Schwab,
2012). Nowadays, according to Schwab (2013:xiii), policymakers must avoid
complacency and press ahead with the structural reforms and critical invest-
ments required to ensure that their countries can provide a prosperous envi-
ronment and employment for their citizens. They must identify and strengthen
the transformative forces that will drive future economic growth. In this per-
spective, future economic growth can be also reached by setting most of the
policymakersreforms around the family business. This is because family rms
are the prevalent form of business worldwide and because they play a signicant
role in the global economy (Prencipe et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, when we talk about family rms there is a common percep-
tion that family-owned businesses do not grow. Citing Ward (1997:323), we
can say that businesses fail because, more often than not, these people never
make the decisions needed to ensure the vitality of their companies in an ever-
changing, even more complex world. Ward continues with the adage from shirt-
sleeves to shirtsleeves in three generationsby which he expresses the widespread
perception that family rms do not survive over the long term. Most of the
family-business owners rank the six most powerful challenges to the long-term
growth of their respective rms in the following order: (1) maturing business
life cycles and increasing competition, (2) limited capital to fund both family
needs and business growth needs, (3) weak next-generation business leadership,
(4) entrepreneurial leaderships inexibility and resistance to change, (5) con-
icts among sibling successors and (6) disparate family goals, values, and needs
(Ward, 1997:325). Generally, these are the most frequent reasons why family
rms do not experience growth, but, more importantly why they do not be-
come international rms. The internationalization of family rms has become a
doubled-edge sword since, on the one hand, it can enhance a rms growth while,
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on the other hand, it can destroy family wealth (McConaughy et al., 2001). This
is why family rms have traditionally operated in domestic markets.
Notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst attempt
to investigate the role of corruption on the degree of internationalization of
family rms operating in Eastern European countries.
The term corruptionhas been dened in many di¤erent ways, which un-
fortunately di¤er from each other in some aspects; while it may be di¢ cult to
describe, corruption is generally not di¢ cult to recognize when observed. In
most cases, di¤erent observers would agree on whether a particular behavior
connotes corruption. Unfortunately, the behavior is often di¢ cult to observe
because acts of corruption do not typically take place in broad daylight (Tanzi,
1998:564).
Nevertheless, even if it is not easy to dene the term corruption there is
one denition that has the virtue of simplicity which denes it as the act by
which insiders prot at the expense of outsiders (Evans, 1999)or commonly,
the abuse of public power for private gain (e.g., Lapalombara, 1994; Habib &
Zurawicki, 2002; Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Alon & Hageman, 2013). This does
not mean that corruption exists only within public sector, because it is also a
practice well embedded into the private business.
According to Evans, we can group corruption into three main categories,
which are: (a) incidental corruption, (b) systematic corruption and (c) sys-
temic corruption. In the rst typology, we can nd small-scale situations where
the actors are represented by junior public o¢ cials. This group has the smallest
macro-economic cost, nevertheless, it is the most embedded in society and hence
the must hard to remove. The second group includes the systematic corruption
covering the situation in which the actors are whole-of-government departments
or parastatal. This second form of corruption is bigger than the incidental one
even if it can include a similar form of government o¢ cer since it substantially
a¤ects government revenues. Therefore, it can be defeated only through sus-
tained reforms. Finally, there is the systemic corruption, that is, kleptocracy
or government by theft. According to Evans (1999:7), in this situation honesty
becomes irrational, and there is a huge developmental impact.
From the previous literature, we know that corruption is one of the most
signicant impediments to economic growth. It has a negative direct impact
over all aspects of a nations economic development (Campos et al., 1999; Hall
& Jones, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Robertson & Watson,
2004; Ampratwum, 2008; de la Croix & Delavallade, 2009). In particular, it: (a)
reduces human capital, (b) discourages investment, (c) leads to a misallocation
of resources and (d) lowers the quality of public infrastructure and services. As a
result, it is a substantial obstacle to economic development. Notwithstanding, it
is noteworthy that no previous studies investigated the link between corruption
and rms export level (especially family rms). This is an interesting topic since
export and, more generally, internationalization strategies can be considered as
a key determinant of economic growth (see Olney, 2014).
Our analysis is based on rms located in Eastern European countries be-
cause they represent a good investigation environment since, as a¢ rmed by the
previous literature, transition economies are characterized by a high level of
corruption (Hellman et al., 2000; Radaev, 2004; Rose, 2000; Tonoyan et al.,
2010). We use the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS). This is a repeated survey that allows us to consider rm-level data
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on a broad range of dimensions. In particular, starting from two initial waves,
2002 and 2005, we construct a panel data set distinguishing between family
and non-family rms. As dependent variable, we use the percentage of sales
exported in the last scal year while the main explanatory variable is consti-
tuted by an interaction term between the percentage of total annual sales paid
in informal payments and a dummy variable indicating whether the rm is a
family business or not. For the purpose of our research, we dene a family
business following Shanker & Astrachan (1996) and Litz (1995). According to
these authors, a business can be dened as a family rm when the family has
some degree of control over strategic decisions.1 Obviously, it is always di¢ cult
to identify family business phenomena. However, we adopt some confounding
reasonings to distinguish between family and individual business e¤ects.
After having tested for the opportunity of a xed e¤ects approach, we esti-
mate three di¤erent models: a traditional linear model with the inclusion of a
rms specic e¤ects, a stepwise regression model to address multicollinearity
problems and a semiparametric model to account for the fact that the ma-
jority of rms do not export. We obtained several results. First, in contrast
to non-family rms, family rms are particularly sensitive to corruption. Sec-
ond, informal payments aiming to facilitate business operations tend to support
export-oriented rms. Finally, family rms that sell their product mostly in the
domestic market tend to bribe public o¢ cials to secure government contracts.
This study has important implications in terms of market e¢ ciency. Policies
devoted to remove those ine¢ ciencies that hamper business operations would
mainly increase the competitiveness of family rms.
With respect to the existing literature, our study represents the rst attempt
to explore the relationship between corruption and family rmslevel of export.
Most of the literature has studied how rms characteristics inuence export
decisions and international strategies. However, policymakers are not able to
intervene directly on these characteristics whereas our study may provide useful
insights to increase market e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic
literature on the link between family rms and internationalization strategies;
Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 illustrates the econometric methods
we use, while Section 5 presents our main ndings. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the discussion by providing some important policy implications.
2 Internationalization of family rms
Family rms, dened as businesses governed and/or managed with the intention
to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition
controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in
a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or
families(Chua et al., 1999:25), play a crucial role across all economies in the
world.
1The BEEPS relies on a self-identication method asking respondents the following ques-
tion: Which of the following best describes the largest shareholder(s) in your rm?. The
possible answers were: individual, family, domestic company, foreign company, bank, invest-
ment fund, managers of the rm, employees of the rm, government or government agency,
others and dont know. Notice that possible respondents were: chief executive, president, vice
president, director, nance o¢ cer, general manager, managers or owner.
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The role that such rms play in worldwide economies (Beckhard & Dyer,
1983; Stern, 1986; Arono¤ & Ward, 1995; Neubauer & Lank, 1998; La Porta
et al., 1999; IFERA, 2003) is well recognized. Prencipe et al. (2014) provide
interesting data: according to the Family Firm Institute (2008), family rms
are estimated to produce the 7090% of global GDP annually. With respect
to di¤erent geographical context, in North America, family-owned businesses
are about eighty to ninety per cent of all enterprises contributing 64% of the
GDP and employing 62% of the US workforce. With respect to the European
market, we can nd similar results: France has 83% of businesses classied as
family rms, in Germany 79% of those rms employ about 45% of the countrys
workforce and contribute to the 40% of the national turnover, while in Italy
family-owned rms constitute 73% of businesses that employ over 50% of the
Italian workforce. Therefore, it is easy to understand why such rms play an
important role in todays global economy (Zahra, 2003).
However, even if the worldwide role of family rms is well acknowledged,
there is still an issue that has to be managed with respect to the possible clas-
sication of those rms. Nowadays, there is no unique denition of a family
business because Researchers continue to disagree over the denition of a fam-
ily business [. . . ] and there has not yet appeared a framework to help integrate
the many promising approaches (e.g., from strategic management, organiza-
tional theory, economics, sociology, anthropology and psychology) used by re-
searchers to study family rms (. . . ). The theoretical issues with respect to
dening the family rm are still open to debate(Chrisman et al., 2005). This
leads to di¢ culties in comparability between studies and, most important, re-
sults. In this respect, a study conducted on behalf of the European Commission
(KMU Forschung Austria, 2008) mapped the denition of family businessin
33 countries, looking at policy discussions, legal regulations as well as academic
research; the result was a list of 90 di¤erent denitions of family business. This
abundance of denitions and measurements of family rms signals the di¢ culty
in reaching a common operational denition (Prencipe et al., 2014:7).
Notwithstanding, researchers use three di¤erent approaches to analyze fam-
ily rms: (a) traditional, (b) sociological and (c) general management. Through
the traditional view, researchers consider the dimension of the company as the
discriminant between family and non-family rms. Indeed, this approach con-
siders only those family rms of small size, characterized by a slow growth
process and a patriarchal style of leadership applied on a at structure (Casson,
2000).
The second approach is the sociological one (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983; Davis,
1983; Lansberg, 1983; Kepner, 1991). Thanks to this perspective, the family
is considered as an institution that issues the rms strategies and the related
politics. The sociological view focuses on the relationships generated by the
involvement of the family in the business (the family and the rm) (Lansberg,
1983).
Finally, the managerial approach includes: (a) the mono-variables and (b)
the multi-variable groups. The former considers the ownership as the only
relevant variable to describe the family rm character. The latter, which is more
complex, considers other sensitive dimensions such as the generational transition
process, the level of involvement of each family member in the business, their role
in the rms governance and administration and nally the dimension related
to the culture (Lattanzi & Lazzini, 2005).
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Handler (1989) used a multi-variables approach which considers: (a) the
generational transition process, (b) the rms management and (c) the owner-
ship as the fundamental dimensions included into the family business. Similar
approaches were adopted by other important scholars who focused their stud-
ies on the familys capacity to set the strategies of a rm (Donnelley, 1964;
Davis & Tagiuri, 1989; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). An important contribu-
tion is given by Habbershon et al. (2003), which extends the implication of the
resource-based view theory to the family business. They dene the familiness
as unique, inseparable, and synergistic resources and capabilities that arise from
family involvement in the rm and interactions. Chrisman et al. (2005) build a
systematic approach in which they consider that possessing the resources, the
intention, and the vision without the proper behavior does not make a rm a real
family rm. As a result, the essence of a family rm requires: (a) the intention
to maintain family control of the dominant coalition; (b) unique, inseparable,
and synergistic resources and capabilities arising from family involvement and
interactions; (c) a vision set by the family dominant coalition and intended for
trans-generational pursuance and (d) the pursuance of such a vision (Chrisman
et al., 2004; Habbershon et al., 2003).
Thanks to this denition, we are now able to understand which is the most
important contribution given by the presence of family within the business.
Family vision imposes that family rms set their strategies according to a long-
term vision. This is mainly because personal goals, rather than the nancial and
protability goals, are grounded on business continuity and emotional behaviors
such as placing more emphasis on research and development, building reputa-
tion, and improving or broadening market share (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2005).
This behavior is explained in the academic debate through the socioemo-
tional wealth (SEW) theory. According to this theory, the decisions of principals
in family rms are motivated by the desire to preserve accumulated socioemo-
tional endowment even when it contrasts with typical economic and/or nancial
goals (Prencipe et al., 2014:6).
The SEW framework has received extensive empirical support from a number
of studies because when family rms aim to preserve family socioemotional
wealth they give up the opportunity to join a lucrative co-operative, they invest
less in research and development (R&D), and they diversify less (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone, & Castro, 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2007, 2010, in Chen et al., 2014:134). Therefore, what the SEW theory assesses
is that generally family rms tend to limit rms future opportunities to growth
when it can damage the stock of socioemotional wealth. This is more visible
when we talk about rmsinternationalization.
Globalization has forced and is currently still forcing rms of all sizes and
ownership types to expand their business broadly (Parker, 1998; Zahra & George,
2002; Zahra, 2003). The export market is recognized to be an important, as
well an invaluable, method to boost rmsgrowth and to increase market share
when domestic market is full.
As a result family rms, which traditionally have operated in domestic mar-
kets, are forced to get an international prole in order to survive. In doing
so, as aforementioned, internationalization becomes a doubled-edge sword for a
family business: it allows the risk to be spread across geographic segments but
also carries a higher risk of losing wealth (McConaughy et al., 2001; Merino et
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al., 2012). Hence, the SEW theory explains why internationalization (with a
specic concern for export) can be limited in family rms.
Previous literature highlights that rmsinternationalization is inuenced by
two factors: (a) the external environment and (b) rmsspecic factors. Point
(a) impacts indirectly through the high level of domestic competition together
with the high level of technological change forced by the internationalization
process (Ward, 1997). On the contrary, point (b) refers to two di¤erent spe-
cic factors: tangible and intangible values. These can be considered as the
sum of knowledge, culture, ownership and governance (Dunning, 1988; Lu &
Beamish, 2001; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zahra, 1996; Corbetta & Monte-
merlo, 1999; Zahra, 2003). Kontinen & Ojala (2010) present a framework in
which limited nancial capital possibility of long-term planning, making quick
decisions and fear of losing control are the main factors a¤ecting family rms
internationalization.
In particular, ownership inuences mostly the level of internationalization:
Ownership aligns the interests of the family rm and its managers (Lansberg,
1999; Sharma et al., 1996) and promotes executiveswillingness to purse risky
activities such as international expansion (Gallo & Pont, 1996) [. . . ] Inter-
nationalization is a risky strategic move that can trigger conicts within the
family rm. Ownermanagers might want to internationalize their operations
to satisfy their own needs for achievement at the expense of the wealth of their
family. Internationalization may take years to generate prots, depriving the
family of short-term wealth. It also requires di¤erent types of capabilities from
those that already exist within the rm (Zahra & Garvis, 2000). Resolving
these issues requires in addressing the conicts that arise over concerns that
internationalization may alter the rms labor force, values and organizational
culture(in Zahra, 2003: 498). There are studies that highlight a positive re-
lationship between family ownership and internationalization process (Zahra,
2003) while, Fernandez & Nieto (2006) found the opposite result, that is, a
negative correlation between internationalization level and family ownership.
A recent research (Sciascia et al., 2012) suggests that the family owner-
ship has a curvilinear e¤ect on the internationalization of family businesses.
A moderate level of ownership is associated with a high level of international-
ization, while low and high levels of ownership are associated with low levels
of internationalization (Astrachan, 2010). This phenomenon can be explained
through two complementary perspectives: (a) the stewardship theory (Davis
et al., 1997) and (b) the stagnation theory (Miller et al., 2008). According
to the former, an owner considers its rm as an asset that has to be passed
down through generations rather than as an amount of wealth to consume (see
Casson, 1999). Therefore, the internationalization process is relevant to the
rms long-term survival even if it is correlated with a higher economic risk.
In contrast, the stagnation theory assesses that resource restrictions, conserva-
tive strategies and family conicts are considered as the most relevant reasons
why family businesses nd di¢ culties of growth (see Landes, 1949 ; Levinson,
1971; Chandler, 1990; Poza et al., 1997; Jehn, 1997; Grassby, 2000; Allio, 2004;
Schulze et al., 2003; Sciascia et al., 2012).
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3 Data
To study how informal payments a¤ect family rmsexport share, we construct
a panel data set using the BEEPS, a repeated survey developed jointly by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. This
data set allows us to consider rm-level data on a broad range of dimensions:
business environment, performance of rms, business-government relations, rm
nancing, labor, infrastructure, informal payments and corruption, and other
topics such as training and innovation. The BEEPS was initially conceived to
build comparative measures across transition economies. For this reason, rst
rounds only considered Eastern European countries, the former Soviet Union
and Turkey. In contrast, more recent surveys include a larger number of coun-
tries. However, these waves do not distinguish between family and non-family
businesses. Therefore, in order to conduct our analysis, we relied on two initial
waves, 2002 and 2005, respectively. Both waves were designed to be as repre-
sentative as possible of the population of rms within the industry and sector.
To ensure a su¢ cient number of observations in the tails of the distribution of
rms, initial rounds were based on a random sampling technique supplemented
by elements of quota restrictions. The sampling strategy is particularly rele-
vant in panel data studies because xed e¤ects estimates can be generalized to
the entire population only if rms have similar values of independent variables.
Table 1 describes our variables and provides some summary statistics.
As dependent variable, we consider the percentage of sales exported by the
establishment. This percentage includes both direct and indirect exports (i.e.,
exports that are mediated by a third party). The average export share is 10.19%,
while domestic markets cover something like 89.81% of total sales. As expected,
internationally-oriented rms represent a small fraction of the population. This
means that our dependent variable is left-censored. More specically, by looking
at the distribution of the dependent variable, the 74.71% of rms do not sell
their products abroad; on the contrary, only a 1.76% of rms export all their
production.
Since rms may decide to export in order to avoid signicant informal costs,
we use two alternative measures of informal payments. A rst measure concerns
the fraction of sales paid in order to bribe public o¢ cials. In this case, respon-
dents were asked: It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make
gifts or informal payments to public o¢ cials to get things donewith regard
to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc. On average, what percent
of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like
this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public o¢ cials for this purpose?.
The second measure refers to the fraction of contract value that an establish-
ment pays to secure or attempt to secure a government contract. In particular,
respondents were asked: When establishments like this one do business with
the government, what percent of the contract value would be typically paid in
informal payments or gifts to secure the contract?. In order to investigate
how informal costs inuence the family rms decision to export, we interact
these two measures of corruption with a dummy variable taking value one if the
establishment belongs to a family business and zero otherwise.
Obviously, in this context, causality problems may arise. For instance, in-
formal payments might be requested in order to facilitate the acquisition of
particular licenses. Analogously, taxes to export and shipping procedures may
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lead to additional corruption costs. In other words, internationally oriented
rms might be subject to additional informal costs. For this reason, we use a
control function approach to address endogeneity issues. Following Fisman &
Svensson (2007), we instrument the corruption cost with the average corruption
cost reported by other rms within the same country-industry-year. In other
words, for each country-industry-year, we compute the average level of infor-
mal payments reported by all rms except the rm for which the instrument is
computed.
The remaining independent variables include several dimensions that can
be potentially related to the export share. We use the establishments total
annual sales, the number of full-time production workers at the end of the scal
year and the number of full-time temporary employees employed at the end of
the last scal year in order to control for possible scale e¤ects. Total sales are
converted into US Dollars and the average amount of sales is US $3,385,552. The
average number of full-time permanent production workers is 74.86, with the
largest rm employing 2,535 workers. This number must be augmented by the
presence of temporary workers. On average, each rm employs 31.2 full-time
temporary workers. Furthermore, we consider the number of non-production
workers such as managers, administrators and commercial employees to control
for the stimulus to internationalization coming from white collar workers.
Since the capacity to comply with consumers tastes is crucial to survive
in the market, we consider whether R&D activity is stimulated by competitors
or consumers. For our rms, customers and domestic competitors are the main
sources of innovation. We also control for human capital accumulation exploiting
information on investments in formal training programs.
We also use data on access to credit, asset composition and structure of
ownership to control for the possible link between physical capital availability
and the decision to export. In contrast, the decision to export forces rms
to bear additional costs. However, rms facing some liquidity constraints are
more vulnerable to international competition. Table 1 shows that our sample
is composed of rms that consider access to credit a minor obstacle for their
business. At the same time, internal funds represent the 70% of total capital,
with an average share of capital for the largest owner equal to 77.3%.
Finally, we consider the establishments age and the presence of an internationally-
recognized quality certication. The majority of rms do not own any interna-
tional certicate.
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4 Methodology
Our analysis aims to establish a link between bribery and the export share.
In particular, we want to investigate whether corruption costs inuence family
rmsexport. Given the structure of our data, we must take into account several
important issues. First, since rms are heterogeneous, we must consider the
e¤ects of this heterogeneity on the decision to export. Second, because many
rms simply do not export, our dependent variable is left-censored at zero.
Third, delicate questions such as those regarding informal payments may show
a high rate of misreporting. In other words, respondents may lie by declaring
the absence of informal payments just because they want to hide illegal activities
or they want to comply with socially desirable outcomes. Finally, the decision
to export may expose rms to additional informal costs. In this case, reverse
causality becomes a source of endogeneity bias. Therefore, we proceed by steps,
where in each step we address a specic issue.
By exploiting the panel structure of our dataset, we rst estimate a linear
model with xed e¤ects.2 This method generates estimates that are robust to
unobserved, xed heterogeneity across rms. In particular, we estimate the
following specication:
EXit = + IPit + diIPit + 
0Xit + i + t + "it; (1)
where EXit is the export share of rm i at time t, IPit represents the percentage
of sales paid in informal payments by rm i at time t, di is a dummy variable
taking value 1 if rm i is a family business, Xit is a matrix of time-varying
covariates, i is the rm-specic e¤ect; t are time dummies and "it is the error
term. The usual assumption is that errors are independently and identically
distributed. Since we may expect cross-country heteroskedasticity, we use a
robust variance matrix to account for correlation within countries (clusters).
Here, the variable of interest is the interaction term diIPit. This term cap-
tures the informal payments declared by family rms; while its coe¢ cient, ,
represents the correction to  necessary to estimate the marginal impact of these
costs on export for family businesses.3 Note that the direct impact of being a
family business is absorbed by i.
As mentioned above, survey data on illegal activities may present a system-
atic error due to di¤erent misreporting incentives. This means that, if di¤erent
categories of respondents have di¤erent incentives to misreport the amount of
informal payments, our estimates could be biased. We know that the larger the
measurement error, the closer are estimators to zero. This underestimation is
known as attenuation bias (see Wooldrige, 2002). However, if the measurement
error is a xed e¤ect itself, our estimates completely eliminate the bias.
Since our baseline specication includes several control variables, they are
likely to be correlated. This means that our conclusions could be invalidated
by the presence of multicollinearity. A common and easy way to select a subset
of independent variables from a complex specication is through stepwise re-
gression. This is a semi-automated process of building a model by successively
2The decision to estimate a xed e¤ects model is supported by a Hausman specication
test (Hausman, 1978).
3 In model (1), the contribution of corruption can be rewritten as follows: ( +di)IPit,
where  is the marginal coe¢ cient of corruption when di = 0, while  + is the marginal
coe¢ cient of bribe when di = 1.
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removing and adding covariates. The subset of explanatory variables is selected
on the basis of the t-statistics. That is, a variable enters the nal model only
if its statistical signicance is above a xed threshold. Although a stepwise
regression may be useful in addressing multicollinearity problems, an improper
use of this technique may lead to a poor model, giving a false sense of security.
For this reason, we use the stepwise regression only to validate our conclusions.
Despite the interesting properties of model (1), this specication does not
take into account the fact that data are censored. At the same time, standard
censored regression models are described by nonlinear functions and therefore
the usual maximum likelihood estimator for xed e¤ects leads to biased and
inconsistent results.4 Moreover, as stated by Honoré (1992): The problems
with estimating limited dependent variable models with xed e¤ects from panel
data are most acute when the time dimension of the panel is low. To avoid
these problems, Honoré proposes a semiparametric, xed e¤ects estimator for
truncated and censored regression models in panel data with just two or three
periods. Therefore, following this approach, we use a trimmed least squares
estimator, obtaining parameters that are both asymptotically consistent and
easy to calculate.
When data are censored, the observed EXit is dened by the following mea-
surement equation:
EXit =

EXit if EXit > 0
0 if EXit = 0
(2)
where EXit is a latent variable that is observed for export shares greater than
0 and censored otherwise.
The estimated model is
EXit = + IPit + diIPit + 
0Xit + i + t+ "it; (3)
where t captures the existence of a time-trend emerging from (1).5 Note that,
with respect to the standard Tobit model, we do not need to assume either a
parametric form for the disturbances nor homoskedasticity across observations.
Inference is based on the method of kernels. This method allows us to obtain
consistent estimates of the variances of coe¢ cients (see Honoré, 1992: 546).
After having studied the role of heterogeneity and censoring on our baseline
model, we must verify that the nature of family rms a¤ects the relationship be-
tween informal payments and international orientation. That is, we must check
that our main explanatory variables are not proxying other channels a¤ecting
the export share. To do this, we estimate two confounding models:
i) we replace IP with a variable measuring those informal payments not related
to international orientation. This variable is the percentage of total sales
that an establishment pays to secure or attempt to secure public contracts
(IPC). If IP refers to bribes paid to get things done, IPC is related to
4The terminology censored regression model could be misleading in this case. Following
Wooldridge (2002), we should refer to our model as a corner solution model. In a corner
solution model, the issue is not data observability, but measures such as E(EXit) and the
marginal e¤ects of the explanatory variables on the outcome variable. In this setting, ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation leads to estimates that are biased and inconsistent, whereas
Tobit estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal (Amemiya, 1973).
5We use a time-trend variable because Honorés method does not allow for the inclusion
of dummy variables.
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payments devoted to eliminate domestic competition. For this reason,
family rms that pay to secure public contracts should be less inclined to
face international competition;
ii) we replace the dummy variable for family rms with a dummy variable for
individual rms. In this way, we aim at excluding that the former is
proxying some common traits with individual rms (see Section 1).
We expect these models to be less appropriate than our initial specication.
When we estimate the relationship between informal payments and the de-
cision to export, simultaneity problems can easily arise. On the one hand, by
facing high informal costs, rms may decide to avoid part of these costs by just
looking at alternative markets. On the other hand, the decision to export may
cause additional informal costs due to the acquisition of licenses, taxes and ship-
ping procedures. Therefore, we use a control function (CF) approach to test
whether our results are a¤ected by an endogeneity bias. Following Wooldridge
(2002: 612), we use a control function method to estimate a nonlinear panel
data model with unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous explanatory vari-
ables. Consider the following model:
E(EXitjIPit; Xit; i; "it) = f(IPit; Xit; i; "it); (4)
where f is a general nonlinear function, Xit is a matrix of strictly exogenous
variables, whereas IPit is allowed to be correlated with "it. We then estimate
the following linear reduced form:
IPit = a+ bXit + cZit + uit; (5)
where Zit is a matrix of excluded regressors. We compute buit from (5) and
insert it into (4). That is, we estimate the following second-stage equation:
E(EXitjIPit; Xit; i; "it) = f(IPit; Xit; i; buit; "it): (6)
In other words, the control function method is based on a simple two-step
procedure. First, we estimate a reduced form (pooled across t) for the percentage
of informal payments, obtaining the residuals, buit for all pairs (i; t). Second, we
estimate a Tobit model augmented by the vector of residuals buit. To account
for rst-stage estimation, inference is based on a bootstrap method.
The intuition behind the CF method is the following: if a covariate is a¤ected
by the outcome variable, regressing this covariate on a set of exogenous regres-
sors would lead to an error term correlated with the initial outcome, therefore,
including this error term in the second-stage equation will lead to less biased
estimates. For linear models, the control function approach mimics two-stage
least squares, while for nonlinear models it o¤ers some important advantages
(see Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).
5 Results
Our main task was to test whether the impact of informal costs on the ex-
port share changes between family and non-family rms. Table 2 presents the
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estimates for the export share.6
Column 1 reports the estimated coe¢ cients of equation (1). By including
rms xed e¤ects in a simple linear regression, we can see that the explanatory
power of our model is extremely high (R2 = 79%). The Rho-statistic shows that
83% of the variance is explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, only
the interaction term diIPit has a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient,
while for non-family rms the impact of informal costs on the export share is
negligible. The existence of a positive correlation between informal costs and
the export share for family rms implies that a higher export share is associated
with higher informal costs. Nonetheless, before drawing any conclusion, several
robustness checks are needed.
For this reason, in Column 2, we try to mitigate multicollinearity problems.
Column 2 contains the coe¢ cients of a linear stepwise regression with xed
e¤ects. We rst use a within transformation and then we run a stepwise re-
gression.7 From this column, we can conclude that multicollinearity does not
invalidate our main conclusion. That is, informal costs a¤ect the export share
only if we consider family rms. Moreover, once we control for multicollinearity
problems, the coe¢ cients of some explanatory variables become statistically sig-
nicant. In particular, according to export-oriented rms, the lack of credit is
one of the major problems for their activity. At the same time, the export share
increases with the number of non-production workers such as managers, admin-
istrators and commercial employees. Similarly, the export share is negatively
associated with R&D activity driven by domestic competitors or customers. Be-
sides, the export share is positively related to a measure of business control such
as the share held by the largest owner(s).
Finally, Column 3 reports our Tobit xed e¤ects estimates. These estimates
take into account the censored nature of our dependent variable, and they are
specically designed for panels in which the number of periods is smaller than
three. Again, the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is positive and statistically
signicant at 1%. Here, as in Column 2, internationally-oriented rms are more
sensitive to credit availability. We also conrm the previous ndings about
the number of non-production workers and the R&D activity coming from cus-
tomerspressure. Although, Tobit coe¢ cients, especially these ones, are not so
easy to interpret, their sign conrms what we previously found with a simple
linear regression: only family rms show a negative correlation between the
export share and the fraction of informal payments.
6We reported only those variables for which the estimates are statistically signicant in at
least one model. However, tables with all coe¢ cients are available upon request.
7Note that, during this process, the error variance must be adjusted. The adjustment is
q = 1 + n 1
N K n , where N is the total sample, K is the number of regressors, and n is the
cross-sectional size.
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Table 2: Export Share and IP
Linear FE SW FE Tobit FE
Constant 40.958 12.09
(124.849) (3.607)***
IP it -0.212 -0.264
(0.299) (0.528)
diIP it 6.508 7.089 9.047
(2.956)** (1.867)*** (1.965)***
R&D: dom. comp. -1.163 -1.438 -3.756
(0.966) (0.659)** (3.079)
R&D: cust. -1.474 -1.819 -10.723
(0.861)* (0.693)*** (4.845)**
Ownership 0.081 0.07 0.36
(0.083) (0.033)** (0.209)*
Credit constraints 0.761 1.095 1.66
(1.049) (0.534)** (2.602)
Non-prod. workers 0.047 0.044 0.104
(0.028) (0.011)*** (0.046)**
Additional controls Yes No Yes
Observations 953 953 953
R-squared 0.79
Rho 0.83
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Following the structure of Table 2, Table 3 reports the impacts of our control
variables on rmsexport share. As before, Column 1 shows that the inclusion
of xed e¤ects in a linear model noticeably improves the t. Also, our model
explains more than eighty percent of variability, with almost ninety percent of
this variation explained by individual xed e¤ects. Informal payments to secure
public contracts are negatively related to the export share, and the magnitude
of this e¤ect increases when we consider the interaction term with the family
business dummy variable. This means that rms paying to secure domestic,
public contracts are less interested in exporting their products. One can argue
that public contracts mainly refer to non-tradable good sectors. However, this
e¤ect is particularly severe for family rms even after having controlled for
individual characteristics.
Column 2 of Table 3 supports the idea that multicollinearity might cover
some signicant relationships between our explanatory variables and the export
share. When we use a stepwise regression method to select a smaller set of
covariates, the role of some explanatory variables in explaining the export share
arises. As before, there is a positive correlation between the number of white
collar workers and the export share. Now, investments in formal training and
rms exports are positively associated, while R&D activity due to customers
pressure is still inversely related to export. Finally, the percentage of rm owned
by the largest owner(s) and the credit availability exhibit a weak link with our
dependent variable.
Tobit estimates with xed e¤ects are reported in Column 3. Again, family
rms paying to secure public contracts export less than non-family rms paying
the same informal costs. This suggests a sort of selection mechanism according
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to which the existence of corruption costs increases the probability of family
rms to trade mainly in domestic markets. By looking at Table 2, we can
see that the opposite mechanism holds when corruption costs are intended to
get things done. These two e¤ects suggest a larger sensitivity of family rms
exports to corruption opportunities (treats). In other words, anti-corruption
policies will especially a¤ect family rms exports. However, this conclusion
must be supported by a robustness analysis.
Table 3: Export Share and IPC
Linear FE SW FE Tobit FE
IPCit -0.375 -0.336 -1.689
(0.198)* (0.128)*** (0.862)**
diIPCit -2.387 -2.426 -3.182
(1.246)* (0.66)*** (1.294)**
R&D: cust. -1.445 -1.551 -8.989
(0.859) (0.582)*** (3.459)***
Ownership 0.075 0.067 0.303
(0.066) (0.031)** (0.193)
Credit Access 0.822 0.829 2.603
(0.916) (0.472)* (2.877)
Non-prod. workers 0.054 0.051 0.137
(0.026)* (0.01)*** (0.060)**
Training 2.305 2.573 14.979
(1.445) (1.213)** (7.319)**
Additional controls Yes No Yes
Observations 917 917 917
R-squared 0.84
Rho 0.87
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Table 4 provides two important robustness checks. In the rst two columns,
we conducted a counterfactual exercise for both IP and IPC. In particular,
we tested whether our results truly refer to the family dimension of rms. In
Columns 1 and 2, we replaced the dummy for family rms with a dummy for
individual rms. A family business is an economic organization in which the
decision-making process is inuenced by multiple generations of a family. Vice
versa, owner-manager entrepreneurial rms are not family businesses because
they lack the multigenerational dimension and family inuence. Therefore,
even if individual and family businesses share some common traits, this fea-
ture strongly a¤ects the dynamics and relationships of family businesses. We
can conclude that our interaction term, diIPit, is not proxying other dimensions,
but it identies the e¤ect of IP on the export share passing through family busi-
ness characteristics. The same conclusion holds for IPC, where the interaction
term shows that individual rms that pay more to secure public contracts also
export more.
Finally, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 provide the results of our control function
method. This method is devoted to detecting and correcting endogeneity bias.
The coe¢ cients for the rst stage error term show that endogeneity is an issue
only for IPC. When we control for the rst stage error term, the interaction
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term diIPCit becomes statistically insignicant. This means that the negative
coe¢ cient reported in Table 3 might be a signal of reverse causality: family rms
that do not export, perhaps because they are not so competitive, tend to pay a
bribe to secure public contracts. In contrast, once we control for endogeneity,
a positive relationship between IPC and the export share emerges. This is
consistent with the idea that non-family rms decide to export in order to avoid
informal costs related to puclic contracts. However, the reverse channel going
from the export share to informal payments masks this evidence leading to the
negative coe¢ cient of IPC found in Table 3.
On the contrary, the coe¢ cient of diIPit remains negative and statistically
signicant even when we include the rst stage error term obtained from the
CF method. The magnitude of this coe¢ cient is comparable with the coe¢ -
cient reported in the last column of Table 2. The economic intuition is the
following: family rms that are internationally-oriented pay informal costs to
facilitate their operations on the international market. From points of view of
policymakers and regulators, the ght against and prevention of these informal
costs will not benet family rms as long as governments will not remove the
ine¢ ciencies that rms intend to overcome with these payments.
Table 4: Robustness checks for export share (Tobit FE)
Indiv. rms Indiv. rms CF CF
IP IPC IP IPC
IP it (or IPCit) -0.228 -3.972 -11.888 9.689
(0.908) (0.733)*** (17.018) (5.182)*
diIP it (or diIPCit) 0.397 3.717 9.946 -0.767
(1.088) (0.780)*** (2.395)*** (2.498)
CF 11.321 -11.653
(17.178) (5.146)**
R&D: custom. -9.776 -9.034 -12.35 -9.872
(4.530)** (3.495)*** (5.190)** (3.298)***
Ownership 0.357 0.256 0.35 0.271
(0.233) (0.134)* (0.266) (0.181)
Non-prod. workers 0.104 0.137 0.1 0.243
(0.045)** (0.058)** (0.074) (0.116)**
Training 8.572 14.724 11.697 6.216
(6.723) (5.920)** (8.405) (5.734)
Time 1.143 0.038 0.585 -1.818
(1.257) (1.220) (1.816) (0.873)**
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 953 917 879 841
Standard errors in parentheses. Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between corruption costs and
family rmsmarket orientation. By using rm-level data conceived to build
comparative measures across Eastern European countries, we carried out a panel
data analysis designed to control for unobservable heterogeneity. In particular,
after having estimated the usual linear models (with and without model selec-
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tion techniques), we employed a robust semiparametric estimator to control for
censoring and heterogeneity problems.
Despite some common and important limitations such as the fact that the
analysis relies on survey data instead of observational data and we cannot dis-
tinguish between domestic and foreign corruption, this paper sheds some light
on the role played by the informal economy on family rms.
Our main result is that, in terms of international orientation, corruption
costs a¤ect family rms more than non-family ones. In other words, family
businesses are more prone to use informal channels to reach their goals than
non-family businesses. However, it is important to distinguish the grounds for
informal costs. If informal payments are devoted to facilitate businessopera-
tions, these costs tend to increase family rmsexports. In contrast, if informal
payments are devoted to securing public contracts, these additional costs tend
to be inversely related to exports. More specically, family rms that decided
to produce mainly for domestic markets are also more inclined to bear these
costs. To conclude, a government can increase family rmsinternational com-
petitiveness removing those market and institutional ine¢ ciencies that hamper
business operations. This intervention will lower family rmscosts and boost
economic growth and development.
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Technical Appendix (Not intended for publica-
tion)
This technical appendix reports Tables 2-4, including the coe¢ cients of non
signicant variables.
Table 2: Export share and IP
Linear FE SW FE Tobit FE
IP it -0.212 -0.264
(0.299) (0.528)
diIPit 6.508 7.089 9.047
(2.956)** (1.867)*** (1.965)***
Sales 4.99e-08 -9.85e-08
(7.05e-08) (1.05e-07)
R&D: domest. comp. -1.163 -1.438 -3.756
(0.966) (0.659)** (3.079)
R&D: foreign comp. -0.079 1.914
(0.947) (2.587)
R&D: custom. -1.474 -1.819 -10.723
(0.861)* (0.693)*** (4.845)**
Ownership 0.081 0.070 0.36
(0.083) (0.033)** (0.209)*
Establishment age -0.018 0.034
(0.062) (0.113)
Internat. certication 0.587 4.323
(2.266) (6.760)
Credit constraints 0.761 1.095 1.66
(1.049) (0.534)** (2.602)
Internal funds 0.018 0.047
(0.023) (0.061)
Prod. workers 0.016 0.014
(0.015) (0.018)
Non-prod. workers 0.047 0.045 0.104
(0.028) (0.011)*** (0.046)**
Temporary workers 0.012 -0.011
(0.029) (0.037)
Training 1.033 8.775
(1.810) (6.673)
Year=2005 -0.234
(1.148)
Constant 40.958 12.090
(124.849) (3.607)***
Observations 953 953
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
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Table 3: Export share and IPC
Linear FE SW FE Tobit FE
IPCit -0.375 -0.336 -1.689
(0.198)* (0.128)*** (0.862)**
diIPCit -2.387 -2.426 -3.182
(1.246)* (0.66)*** (1.294)**
Sales 2.40e-08 -1.12e-09
(6.40e-08) (8.99e-08)
R&D: domest. comp. 0.052 0.673
(1.128) (3.028)
R&D: foreign comp. -0.586 -0.579
(0.790) (2.555)
R&D: custom. -1.445 -1.551 -8.989
(0.859) (0.582)*** (3.459)***
Ownership 0.075 0.067 0.303
(0.066) (0.031)** (0.193)
Establishment age 0.006 0.17
(0.067) (0.119)
Internat. certication 2.126 10.624
(2.567) (8.770)
Credit constraints 0.822 0.829 2.603
(0.916) (0.472)* (2.877)
Internal funds -0.014 -0.002
(0.018) (0.052)
Prod. workers 0.008 -0.012
(0.022) (0.036)
Non-prod. workers 0.054 0.051 0.137
(0.026)* (0.01)*** (0.060)**
Temporary workers 0.01 -0.013
(0.037) (0.040)
Training 2.305 2.573 14.979
(1.445) (1.213)** (7.319)**
Year=2005 -1.017
(0.819)
Constant -8.725
(136.289)
Observations 917 917
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
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Table 4: Robustness checks for export share (Tobit FE)
Indiv. rms Indiv. rms CF CF
IP IPC IP IPC
IP it (or IPCit) -0.228 -3.972 -11.888 9.689
(0.908) (0.733)*** (17.018) (5.182)*
diIP it (or diIPCit) 0.397 3.717 9.946 -0.767
(1.088) (0.780)*** (2.395)*** (2.498)
CF 11.321 -11.653
(17.178) (5.146)**
Sales -8.57e-08 -3.70e-08 -2.20e-07 -1.99e-07
(1.05e-07) (8.17e-08) (1.44e-07) (1.46e-07)
R&D: dom. comp. -3.86 0.377 -4.039 2.972
(2.943) (2.399) (3.309) (2.265)
R&D: foreign comp. 0.885 -0.916 3.246 -0.036
(2.730) (2.276) (4.432) (3.509)
R&D: custom. -9.776 -9.034 -12.35 -9.872
(4.530)** (3.495)*** (5.190)** (3.298)***
Ownership 0.357 0.256 0.35 0.271
(0.233) (0.134)* (0.266) (0.181)
Intern. certication 0.044 0.144 0.045 0.068
(0.106) (0.106) (0.231) (0.211)
Establishment age 4.681 7.189 -0.889 2.732
(6.440) (7.599) (9.470) (6.970)
Credit constraints 1.834 1.935 6.214 -2.376
(2.754) (2.312) (5.205) (2.872)
Internal funds 0.049 0.008 0.088 -0.072
(0.062) (0.044) (0.115) (0.052)
Prod. workers 0.014 -0.029 -0.012 0.064
(0.018) (0.043) (0.037) (0.090)
Non-prod. workers 0.104 0.137 0.1 0.243
(0.045)** (0.058)** (0.074) (0.116)**
Temporary workers -0.01 -0.016 0.231 0.124
(0.037) (0.039) (0.311) (0.370)
Training 8.572 14.724 11.697 6.216
(6.723) (5.920)** (8.405) (5.734)
Time 1.143 0.038 0.585 -1.818
(1.257) (1.220) (1.816) (0.873)**
Observations 953 917 879 841
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signicant at : *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
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